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Arnold  Ruess,  Düsseldorf  Dustin  F.  Guzior 
*  *  * 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Good  afternoon,  everyone.  Welcome  to  the  EU  Trademark 
Update  session.  We  have  one  hour  to  cover  lots  of  cases,  everything  that  happened  in  the 
last  year  in  the  European  Union  trademark-wise.  We  are  going  to  talk  about  the Lionel 
Messi  case;  debranding  and  rebranding;  new  types  of  nontraditional  trademarks  and  the  1
first  experiences  of  the  EUIPO ;  and  acquired  distinctiveness  and  descriptive  marks.  So, 
2
lots  to  cover  within  this  one  hour. 
Without  further  ado,  I  think  we  should  get  right  into  it.  James  is  going  to  give  us 
an  overview  of  the  last  twelve  months. 
MR.  NURTON:  Thank  you  very  much  indeed,  Sven.  It  is  a  privilege  to  be  here 
on  World  IP  Day  and  to  be  talking  about  CJEU  (or,  if  you  prefer,  ECJ)  cases.  I  
3
understand  I  have  been  given  twelve  minutes.  Twelve  minutes  in  Fordham  terms  is 
practically  a  lifetime,  so  I  feel  very  privileged  by  that. 
 For  those  of  you  who  are  not  based  in  the  European  Union,  I  thought  it  would  be 
helpful  to  briefly  refresh  the  context  of  what  we’ll  be  talking  about. 
This  is  a  summary  of  the  EU  court  system.  The  Court  of  Justice  sits  at  the  apex  of  this 
system.  The  General  Court,  a  separate  court  with  separate  judges,  is  underneath  it  and 
hears  for  our  purposes  appeals  from  EUIPO.  The  CJEU  also  deals  with  referrals  from 
national  courts  on  a  variety  of  questions,  including  those  relating  to  trademarks  and 
designs. 
According  to  the  recently  published  annual  report,  there  were  ninety-two  IP  cases 
filed  at  the  Court  of  Justice  and  seventy-four  cases  resolved  in  2018.  You  can  see  that 
that’s  broadly  in  line  with  the  previous  four  years. 
The  similar  numbers  for  the  General  Court  were  301  cases  filed  last  year  and  349 
cases  closed.  About  one-third  of  the  General  Court’s  caseload  is  appeals  from  EUIPO.  So 
hundreds  of  cases  to  look  at,  but  I  am  just  going  to  focus  on  three  today. 
As  we  discussed,  today  is  World  IP  Day,  and  as  I’m  sure  you  know,  the  theme  of 
this  year’s  World  IP  Day  is  sport.  So,  where  better  to  start  than  Lionel  Messi,  who  was 
the  subject  of  a  case  that  was  actually  decided  on  World  IP  Day  last  year,  April  26,  2018. 
It  is  a  case  that  has  generated  a  lot  of  comment.  
For  those  of  you  who  don’t  follow  football  —  I’m  conscious  that  we  are  in  the 
States  and  you  may  not  know  much  about  Mr.  Messi  —  he  is  the  captain  of  both  FC 
Barcelona  and  the  Argentina  national  team  and  widely  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  —  if 
not  the  best  —  footballer  in  the  world.  The  other  party,  Massi,  is  an  Italian  cycling  brand. 
Mr.  Messi  filed  a  figurative  European  Union  Trade  Mark  (EUTM)  application 
which  included  his  name  covering  various  clothing  and  sporting  goods.  Massi  opposed  it 
based  on  its  registration  and  subsequent  use  of  M ASSI . 
1   Case  T-554/14,  Lionel  Andrés  Messi  Cuccittini  v.  European  Union  Intellectual  Property 
Office,  http://curia.europa.eu.  
2  European  Union  Intellectual  Property  Office.  
3  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union.  
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The  Opposition  Division  and  Board  of  Appeal  both  found  a  likelihood  of 
confusion  and  upheld  the  opposition,  but  the  General  Court  disagreed.  Why?  They  agreed 
with  the  Board  of  Appeal  that  the  marks  covered  identical  or  highly  similar  goods.  They 
also  agreed  that  they  were  visually  and  phonetically  similar  —  in  fact,  they  said  they 
were  “highly  phonetically  similar”  —  but  they  found  they  were  conceptually  different. 
The  reasons  were  essentially  that  Mr.  Messi’s  fame  across  the  general  public  was  such 
that  it  should  be  taken  as  read. 
The  Board  of  Appeal  acknowledged  the  conceptual  dissimilarity  between  the  two 
brands  but  said  that  only  football  fans  would  perceive  this  and  not  the  entire  relevant 
public.  The  Court  said  this  was  wrong.  The  Court  said  that  most  of  the  public  would 
recognize  Messi  as  a  footballer,  and  this  would  be  even  more  the  case  where  sporting 
goods  were  concerned.  The  key  part  is  that  the  Court  says:  “The  reputation  of  the  Messi 
name  is  a  well-known  fact,  that  is  to  say  a  fact  that  is  likely  to  be  known  by  anyone  or 
that  may  be  known  by  generally  accessible  sources.”  Thus,  the  Court  concluded  that  “the 
conceptual  differences  between  the  marks  was  such  as  to  neutralize  the  visual  and 
phonetic  similarities  and  there  was  no  likelihood  of  confusion.” 
I  think  the  question  for  this  case  really  is:  How  far  does  it  go?  Clearly,  Messi  is 
very  famous.  How  many  other  people  would  have  that  degree  of  fame  that  they  should  be 
recognized  in  this  way?  Anyway,  as  I  stand  here,  Lionel  Messi  is  celebrating  another 
victory.  However,  the  EUIPO  has  appealed  this  to  the  Court  of  Justice,  so  we  are  awaiting 
their  decision. 
The  second  case  I  am  going  to  talk  about  is  another  one  that  has  caused  a  large 
amount  of  comment,  in  particular  because  the  Court  of  Justice  disagreed  with  its  own 
Advocate  General  and  ruled  effectively  that  a  trademark  owner  can  prevent  a  third  party 
from  removing  trademarks  from  genuine  goods  imported  from  outside  the  European 
Union. 
The  case  concerns  Mitsubishi  forklift  trucks.  Mitsubishi  of  course  owns  both  4
word  and  figurative  marks.  It  brought  this  case  in  the  Belgian  court  against  two 
companies  called  Duma  and  GSI.  The  two  defendants  acquired  the  forklift  trucks  outside 
of  the  EEA  and  placed  them  in  a  Customs  warehousing  procedure,  which  is  a  sort  of 
commercial  purgatory  before  you  enter  the  European  Union.  They  removed  the MITSUBISHI 
marks,  added  new  trademarks  and  serial  numbers,  and  made  some  technical  changes 
before  releasing  them  for  sale.  The  questions  referred  from  the  Belgian  court  were 
effectively:  Did  these  actions  amount  to  use  in  the  course  of  trade? 
(1)  (a)  Do  Article 5  of  Directive  2008/95  and  Article 9  of  Council 
Regulation  No 207/2009  cover  the  right  of  the  trade  mark  proprietor  to 
oppose  the removal,  by  a  third  party,  without  the  consent  of  the  trade 
mark  proprietor,  of  all  signs  identical  to  the  trade  marks  which  had  been 
applied  to  the  goods  (debranding),  in  the  case  where  the  goods 
concerned  have  never  previously  been  traded  within  the  EEA,  such  as 
goods  placed  in  a  customs  warehouse,  and  where  the  removal  by  the  third 
party  occurs  with  a  view  to  importing  or  placing  those  goods  on  the 
market  within  the  EEA? 
4  Case  C-129/17,  Mitsubishi  Shoji  Kaisha  Ltd  v.  Duma  Forklifts  NV  (July  25,  2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu.  
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 (b)  Does  it  make  any  difference  to  the  answer  to  question  (a)  above   
whether  the  importation  of  those  goods  or  their  placing  on  the  market 
within  the  EEA  occurs  under  its  own  distinctive  sign  applied  by  the  third 
party  (rebranding)? 
(2)  Does  it  make  any  difference  to  the  answer  to  the  first  question 
whether  the  goods  thus  imported  or  placed  on  the  market  are,  on  the  basis 
of  their  outward  appearance  or  model,  still  identified  by  the  relevant 
average  consumer  as  originating  from  the  trade-mark  proprietor?’ 
The  Advocate  General  concluded,  in  essence,  that  they  did  not  because  they  had  not  been 
placed  on  the  market  in  the  European  Union.  However,  the  Court  of  Justice  reached  the 
opposite  conclusion.  We  can  probably  discuss  in  the  panel  a  bit  more  about  why  this  was, 
but  essentially  the  Court  of  Justice  felt  that  the  proprietor  is  entitled  to  control  the  first 
placing  of  goods  bearing  its  mark  on  the  market  in  the  EEA  and  that  removing  the  marks 
deprives  a  trademark  proprietor  of  its  right  to  control  this  initial  marketing  of  the  goods. 
It  also  discussed  the  various  functions  of  the  trademark  and  the  adverse  effect 
that  the  defendants’  actions  had,  in  particular,  the  functions  of  guaranteeing  quality, 
advertising,  and  investment.  In  particular,  it  said  that  an  action  preventing  the  proprietor 
of  a  registered  trademark  from  exercising  its  right  to  control  the  first  placing  of  goods 
bearing  that  mark  on  the  market  by  its  very  nature  undermines  the  essential  function  of 
the  trademark  —  that  is,  of  course,  of  identifying  origin  —  and  this  was  even  more  the 
case  where,  as  here,  the  consumers  would  be  likely  to  recognize  the  products  as 
Mitsubishi  trucks. 
The  immediate  reaction  to  this  decision  was  some  surprise.  One  very  experienced 
trademark  barrister  said  “err,  what?”  on  Twitter.  Another  commenter  followed  that:  “Just 
started  reading  this.  They  have  gone  full  batshit  crazy  here.” 
There  has  been  much  debate  about  how  much  protection  this  gives  to  trademark 
proprietors  and  whether  it  is  justified  or  not,  and  whether  perhaps  the  Court  is  trying  to 
deal  with  issues  which  rightly  are  within  unfair  competition  law  rather  than  trademark 
law,  unfair  competition  law,  of  course,  not  being  harmonized  in  the  European  Union. 
The  third  and  final  case  I’m  going  to  look  at  is Koton  v.  Nadal  Esteban  regarding  
5
the  K OTON  trademark.  The  question  here  was  very  helpfully  summarized  by  Advocate 
General  Kokott  when  she  says,  “What  constitutes  bad  faith  and  how  can  it  be 
established?”  She  clearly  feels  there  are  some  unanswered  questions  on  this  topic.  The 
opinion  was  published  just  a  couple  of  weeks  ago.  We  don’t  yet  know  what  the  Court’s 
judgment  will  be,  or  of  course  whether  they  will  follow  her  opinion. 
 This  is  another  case  concerning  an  EU  trademark.  Mr.  Nadal  Esteban  applied  for  the  
mark  shown  on  the  left.  Koton  successfully  opposed  the  registration  in  two  of  the  three 
classes  that  he  applied  for,  and  you  can  see  why  I  imagine.  The  mark  was  registered  for 
services  in  class  39. 
 There  was  some  history  between  the  parties.  Koton  challenged  this  registration  on  the  
grounds  of  bad  faith.  The  challenge  was  rejected  by  everyone  up  to  and  including  the 
5   Case  C-104/18  P,  Koton  Mağazacilik  Tekstil  Sanayi  ve  Ticaret  AŞ  v.  EUIPO, 
http://curia.europa.eu.  
 
Verbatim  Transceedings,  Inc. 714/960-4577 
5 
Session  10B 
 
 
General  Court.  This  was  based  partly  on  the  fact  that  Koton’s  prior  rights  did  not  extend 
to  services  in  class  39. 
However,  Advocate  General  Kokott  took  a  sledgehammer  to  the  General  Court 
decision  in  my  view.  She  set  out  five  arguments  why  the  Court  was  wrong  in  what  it  said 
about  the  goods  and  services  needing  to  be  similar,  and  she  drew  on  the  Court’s  case  law 
on  what  constitutes  “abusive  conduct”  and  said,  in  particular,  that  bad  faith  “constitutes  a 
departure  from  accepted  principles  of  ethical  behaviour  or  honest  commercial  and 
business  practices.”  So  the  question  of  whether  the  goods  of  the  two  marks  are  identical 
or  similar  is  just  one  factor  that  should  be  taken  into  account  in  the  overall  evaluation.  
She  said  the  burden  of  proof  falls  on  the  trademark  applicant.  In  this  case,  there 
was  some  evidence  that  he  had  knowledge  of  the  original KOTON  mark;  he  had  obviously 
filed  in  these  other  goods  and  services;  and  had  no  legitimate  interest  in  using  the  mark; 
therefore,  he  did  not  show  legitimate  economic  purpose  or  an  economic  logic  and  there 
was  bad  faith. 
She  also  briefly  addressed  the  question  of  whether  bad  faith  can  be  divided, 
whether  you  could  be  found  to  have  bad  faith  for  one  part  of  an  application  but  not 
another  part.  She  actually  didn’t  decide  this,  because  it  wasn’t  really  necessary,  but  she 
did  say  that  similar  questions  to  this  have  been  raised  in  the Sky  v.  Skykick  case ,  which 6
has  been  referred  from  the  U.K.  court.  The  hearing  on  that  is  next  month,  so  that  is 
definitely  worth  looking  out  for.  The  Advocate  General  described  this  issue  as  “highly 
explosive,”  and  I  think  our  panelists  might  have  more  to  say  on  that  shortly. 
Those  are  the  three  cases  I’ve  covered.  I  think  they  are  all  interesting  in 
themselves.  They  all  show  that  different  judges  and  advocates  general  can  reach  different 
conclusions  even  on  the  same  set  of  facts,  which  I  think  is  interesting  as  well.  And, 
arguably,  they  all  in  different  ways  indicate  a  preference  for  what  you  might  call  strong 
trademarks  —  well-known  footballer,  an  established  brand,  and  so  on.  Hopefully  lots  for 
us  to  discuss  in  the  panel. 
If  you  want  to  know  more  about  the  CJEU  cases,  I  recommend  their  website, 
curia.europa.eu,  and  in  particular  the  search  function. 
Thank  you  very  much. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you,  James,  for  the  great  overview. 
I  would  like  to  use  the  discussion  now  to  talk  about  the Mitsubishi 
debranding/rebranding  case,  as  it  was  quite  surprising.  I  think  for  many  in  Germany  it 
might  have  had  a  different  outcome;  it  might  have  been  said  that  there  was  “no  use/no 
infringement”  and  it  would  have  been  left  to  unfair  competition  law.  Now  this  judgment 
actually  bolsters  the  protection  of  trademark  owners  quite  a  lot. 
My  question  to  the  panel  is:  Did  the  Court  get  it  right  here  or  did  it  extend  the 
term  of  use  too  far?  What  are  your  thoughts  on  it? 
MR.  RUESS:  I  think  we  covered  that  argument  in  the  previous  session.  I  think 
you’re  right,  Sven.  If  you  look  at  it  from  a  German  court  perspective,  or  from  most  of  the 
other  national  EU  courts’  perspectives,  then  you  would  say:  “It  is  a  source  indicator. 
Somebody  has  to  bring  this  stuff  into  the  European  Union.  But  it  wasn’t  in  the  European 
Union,  so  that  is  probably  not  an  issue.” 
6  Case  C-371/18,  Sky  PLC  v.  Skykick  Inc.,  http://curia.europa.eu. 
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Here  again  we  have  the  CJEU  looking  at  the  investment  function.  There  were  a 
few  case-specific  things.  The  opponent  in  the Mitsubishi case  previously  was  the  official 
sub-dealer  for  Belgium,  so  that  probably  added  some  sort  of  bad  flavor  to  the  case. 
I  think  it  is  probably  a  little  far  fetched.  It  is  a  valid  argument  to  say  that  “I  as  a 
trademark  owner  can  control  whether  I  want  to  bring  my  product  into  a  certain  market,” 
and  that’s  very  common.  
We  act  for  Sony  Computer  Entertainment,  and  we  always  seize  products  to 
litigate  against  products  that  were  bought  in  Japan  and  brought  into  Germany  with  the 
SONY  or  PLAYSTATION  trademarks.  So,  I  think  it  probably  went  a  little  too  far. 
The  interesting  question  —  and  this  I  would  not  answer  myself  but  probably  this 
is  something  for  the  remaining  discussion  —  the  interesting  question  is:  What  would 
have  happened  if  those  products  had  been  brought  into  the  EU  market  and  then  the 
debranding  would  have  happened?  Then  probably  even  the  CJEU  would  have  said, 
“Okay,  fine,  that’s  good.”  I  really  fail  to  understand  why  they  say  the  warehousing 
procedure  is  not  that  big  of  a  deal,  but  I  think  it  is  overdone. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Other  comments? 
JUDGE  BRINKMAN:  I  think  also  that  the  CJEU  was  overreaching  here  a  little 
bit,  to  be  honest.  The  position  in  Holland  is  similar  to  what  it  is  in  Germany,  where  we 
would  have  probably  said,  “I  don’t  see  any  trademark  use  here.”  Saying  that  everybody 
would  see  a  picture  of  the  tractor  involved  and  then  consider  it  as  coming  from 
Mitsubishi  is  a  factor  of  a  different  IP  right,  if  you  may,  but  not  a  factor  in  trademark  law. 
Perhaps  you  could  take  that  into  consideration  when  you  are  assessing  “Is  there  confusion 
between  the  trademarks?”  For  that  you  can  get  all  arguments  or  all  circumstances  in 
there.  
But  saying  that  already  this  constitutes  use,  I  find  it  still  difficult  to  see  the 
argument.  But  it  is  there,  and  we  have  to  live  with  it,  I  suppose. 
MS.  MARTINS  RIBEIRO:  I  just  want  to  add  that  the  Advocate  General  had  a 
completely  different  position;  he  considered  that  there  was  no  use  of  the  trademark.  So  it 
is  with  all  the  knowledge  of  another  possibility  to  solve  the  case  that  the  Court  took  this 
decision.  That  means  that  the  Court  really  wanted  to  go  a  little  bit  beyond  what  the 
simple  use  in  the  course  of  trade  was  as  it  is  normally  considered.  The  fact  that  the 
products  should  be  imported  and  placed  on  the  market  in  the  EEA  probably  had  some 
importance  because  it  is  repeated  in  the  decision. 
But,  anyway,  we  cannot  think  that  the  Court  didn’t  think  about  the  meaning  of 
the  use  of  a  trademark.  The  Court  knew  it  very  well,  and  the  Advocate  General  was  of  a 
completely  different  opinion.  That  is  an  important  point  to  take  into  consideration  when 
we  read  the  decision  of  the  Court. 
MR.  NURTON:  I  think  on  its  face  the  decision  seems  counterintuitive,  to  put  it 
charitably.  As  Peter  says,  the  functions  were  central  to  the  Court’s  reasoning;  so,  it  is  the 
investment  function.  They  talk  about  the  advertising  function  as  well,  but  I  don’t  feel  they 
have  really  clarified  exactly  what  those  are  and  how  they  are  distinct  and  to  what  extent 
they  overlap. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you. 
We  will  now  move  on  to  Gordon’s  talk  and  we  might  revisit  the  other  cases  at  the 
end. 
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It  has  been  a  year  and  a  half  since  we  got  rid  of  the  graphical  representation 
requirement  in  the  European  Union  and,  therefore,  have  new  types  of  nontraditional 
trademarks  that  have  been  registered.  We  have  the  first  experiences  at  the  EUIPO. 
Gordon  will  share  his  views  on  that. 
MR.  HUMPHREYS:  Good  afternoon.  I  think  that  this  time  I  am  in  the  fortunate 
position  of  allowing  you  to  go  to  the  movies  with  me  in  some  ways.  But,  before  I  do  that, 
I  would  just  give  some  background  information  about  what  has  been  happening. 
As  we  know,  in  the  wake  of  the  legal  reform,  it  is  no  longer  necessary  for  the 
representation  of  a  mark  to  be  “graphical,”  but  nevertheless  it  has  to  be  in  an appropriate 
form  using  generally  available  technology ,  and  it  has  to  be  clear  and  precise . 
 As  you  can  see  on  the  screen,  motion  marks,  sound  marks,  multimedia  marks,  
holograms,  and  other  trademarks  have  now  been  added  to  the  list  of  possible  marks 
before  the  EUIPO. 
 The  underlying  philosophy  of  this  is  known  by  the  acronym  WYSIWYG  (pronounced  
“whizzy-wig”),  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  hairpiece  but  is  actually  “what  you  see  is 
what  you  get.”  This  approach  tries  to  combine  the  benefits  of  legal  certainty  with 
flexibility  to  cater  for  future  market  developments  and  the  emergence  of  new 
technologies.  For  example,  smell  marks  and  taste  marks  may  become  registrable  at  the 
EUIPO  in  the  future  when  technology  develops  to  cope  with  acceptable  representation 
because  —  at  the  moment  —  samples  are  not  allowed  in  the  European  system. 
I  am  going  to  start  off  with  a  motion  mark.  And,  just  to  give  you  some 
information:  fifty-two  applications  have  been  received  for  motion  marks;  twenty-two 
have  been  registered  and  ten  refused.  We  have  actually  had  four  oppositions.  
This  particular  one  was  for  a  well-known  engine  oil  manufacturer  (Castor  Oil). 
As  you  can  see,  there  are  word  elements  that  come  into  these  marks,  and  sometimes  these 
can  run  into  trouble  with  other  similar  existing  earlier  rights. 
In  this  particular  case  there  were  no  problems  with  getting  this  mark  on  the 
Register.  It  was  considered  to  be  sufficiently  clear  and  precise  and  not  a  problem  from  an 
absolute  grounds  point  of  view. 
This  next  one  is  another  motion  mark,  but  this  time  it  was  refused  because  it  was 
for  communication  instruments  and  vehicle  parts  and  it  was  considered  that  there  was 
nothing  particularly  memorable  about  this  mark.  It  just  looked  like  a  button  which  would 
be  pretty  typical  on  these  types  of  goods.  So  that  one  didn’t  get  very  far. 
This  one  is  a  gesture  mark,  which  is  a  subcategory  of  motion  marks.  This  sign 
was  filed  by  Bang  and  Olufsen  for  class  9  goods.  It  was  actually  refused  for  lack  of 
distinctive  character.  The  question  is:  what  sort  of  gestures  would  be  distinctive?  Maybe 
we’ll  revisit  that  towards  the  end  of  this  presentation.  But  it  was  also  possibly 
objectionable  for  being  functional  because  the  hand  gesture  was  what  actually  turned  the 
screen  on  and  off. 
The  mark  on  the  left  is  a  motion  mark  for  class  35  services  that  was  attempted  to 
be  registered  by  a  Dutch  company.  It  was  objected  to  by  Orange,  one  of  the  telecom 
giants  in  Europe  on  the  basis  of  the  mark  you  can  see  on  the  right.  
Now  we  are  moving  on  to  sound  marks.  This  mark  was  applied  for  by  a  Brazilian 
telecoms  company.  It  was  refused  for  lacking  distinctiveness.  It  was  simply  too  long  to 
remember.  
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Sticking  with  sound  marks,  this  is  an  interesting  one.  [Plays  audio]  Of  course  you 
recognized  that  voice,  I’m  sure,  as  Stephen  Hawking.  It  was  accepted  and  registered  for 
goods  in  classes  9  and  28  and  services  in  36  and  41.  Now,  although  it’s  quite  long,  it  was 
considered  that  the  sounds  of  these  words  were  sufficiently  memorable.  Perhaps  it’s  a 
little  in  contradiction  with  some  of  the  music  sounds  that  have  been  objected  to  for  being 
too  long,  such  as  the  Nowo  sign. 
Now,  if  anybody  thought  that  lawyers  didn’t  have  a  heart,  this  is  a  mark 
representing  a  mechanical  heart  that  has  actually  been  registered  for  IP  and  legal  services. 
It  was  considered  that  this  sign  met  all  the  legal  requirements  and  was  sufficiently 
distinctive,  and  therefore  went  on  the  Register. 
This  trademark  application  does  carry  a  bit  of  a  public  health  warning.  It’s  not  for 
the  faint  of  heart.  The  first  problem  here  was  the  number  of  elements  that  it  contained.  It 
was  considered  that  it  was  too  long  and  detailed  to  be  memorized  or  recalled,  and  that 
therefore  it  couldn’t  act  as  a  proper  indication  of  commercial  origin. 
However,  the  main  problem  here,  which  is  probably  unsurprising  to  you,  was  one 
of  public  policy  and  morality;  it  was  just  simply  too  gruesome  —  although  of  course  the 
particular  public  that  this  sort  of  game  appeals  to  includes  a  public  like  my  teenage  son 
who  spends  most  of  his  time  on  games  of  this  sort  and  has  a  high  tolerance  for  seeing 
blood  and  body  parts.  But,  even  so,  this  sign  was  just  considered  to  be  gratuitously 
violent  and,  therefore,  unacceptable. 
This  trademark  application  came  from  Red  Bull.  It  was  actually,  quite  comically, 
attempted  to  be  registered  for  flight  instruction.  I,  personally,  wouldn’t  like  to  be  flying  in 
that  plane.  There  appeared  on  two  of  the  posts  you  can  see  in  the  foreground  another 
mark, REITLING .  Red  Bull’s  trademark  application  was  deemed  to  have  infringed  the 
REITLING  mark,  or  so  said  the  owners  of  that  mark,  and  this  application  ended  up  being 
withdrawn.  One  of  the  dangers  of  these  multimedia  marks  that  combine  sound  and 
movement  is  they  can  inadvertently  include  word  elements  that  end  up  causing  trouble. 
I’ll  finish  with  this  trademark.  This  is  one  that  actually  came  to  my  Board.  It  is  a 
motion  mark,  but  I  would  say  that  it  falls  into  the  sub-category  of  gesture  mark.  It  is  six 
frames.  It  was  refused  by  the  examiner  for  absolutely  all  the  goods  and  services.  
 But  when  it  came  to  my  Board  we  looked  into  the  case  in  more  detail  and 
considered  that  the  sign  was  not  totally  objectionable.  The  man  in  the  picture  is  a  famous 
Turkish  chef  going  by  the  name  of  Salt  Bae.  His  specialty  is  to  salt  pieces  of  meat  by 
sprinkling  them  and  having  this  particular  pose  that  you  can  see  in  the  images.  We  agreed 
with  the  examiner  that  it  lacked  distinctiveness  for  any  products  related  to  food,  and 
especially  meat  —  because  he’s  salting  meat  —  however,  we  felt  that  it  was  distinctive 
for  non-food  services,  such  as  temporary  accommodation  and  cocktail  bars  and  the  like.  
I  am  pleased  to  say  that  our  approach  has  also  been  adopted  by  the  UKIPO  and  
7
the  USPTO.  Whether  they  read  our  decision  I  don’t  know,  but  anyway  I’m  pleased  to  say 
that  that  has  happened  because  it  is  reassuring  for  us! 
Thank  you  very  much. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you,  Gordon. 
7  United  Kingdom  Intellectual  Property  Office.    
 
Verbatim  Transceedings,  Inc. 714/960-4577 
9 
Session  10B 
 
 
Looking  at  all  these  new  types  of  registrations,  especially  for  example  the  last 
one,  where  you  should  think  that  doing  this  pose  should  be  some  sort  of  commercial 
origin,  you  could  think Are  we  going  to  file  for  trademark  protection?  Or  the  other 
question  is If  we  get  the  trademark,  what’s  the  scope  of  it  actually  and  what  can  we  do 
with  it? 
Joel,  what  are  your  thoughts  on  it? 
MR.  SMITH:  I  was  going  to  make  that  point.  Obviously,  without  the  graphic 
representation  it  gets  that  very  wide  scope  of  registrability  now,  which  on  the  one  hand  is 
very  good  for  brand  owners;  but,  I  suppose,  if  you  are  looking  at  it  from  the  perspective 
of  filing  a  new  brand  and  trying  to  clear  marks,  I  query  whether  searching  is  going  to  be 
quite  as  effective  when  trying  to  protect  elements  of,  say,  a  motion  or  gesture  mark.  That 
is  one  aspect  that  might  concern  me. 
The  other  thing,  I  suppose,  is  it  sounds  like  quite  small  numbers  so  far  have  been 
registered,  but  do  you  think  this  is  likely  to  mushroom  into  quite  large  volumes  of 
unconventional  trademarks? 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Did  you  see  there  was  some  re-registration  maybe  of 
some  marks  going  into  different  categories  post  the  reform? 
MR.  HUMPHREYS:  Obviously,  the  certification  marks  which  were  adopted  by 
the  reform  have  seen  the  biggest  number  of  registrations. 
I  think  sound  marks  are  probably  the  area  where  there  have  been  the  most 
applications  and  quite  a  few  successful  registrations. 
As  to  the  issue  about  how  you  would  search  for  these,  I  think  that’s  probably 
touching  on  what  we  were  looking  at  yesterday  about  the  role  of  artificial  intelligence. 
This  is  the  future. 
And  it’s  not  the  only  thing  that’s  difficult  to  look  for.  Don’t  forget  that  you  have  a 
lot  of  unregistered  designs  in  Europe.  How  do  you  search  for  those,  or  more  complex 
registered  designs  even?  
The  EUIPO  is  looking  at  the  possibility,  in  the  context  of  discussions  on  the 
reform  of  the  Design  Regulation,  of  having  new  types  of  designs  which  could  include 
animation  and  movement  designs. 
So,  the  world  is  changing  and  we  have  to  keep  up  somehow. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Yes. 
Do  we  have  any  questions  or  comments? 
QUESTION  [Christian  Liedtke,  acuminis  LLP,  Costa  Mesa,  CA]:  Gordon,  in  the 
United  States  we  have  for  special  marks  like  this  a  concept  called  secondary  meaning, 
where  the  applicants  have  to  make  a  significant  showing  in  order  to  even  basically  get 
their  foot  in  the  door.  Converse,  for  instance,  had  difficulty  achieving  that.  What  is  the 
situation  for  marks  like  the  ones  you  were  discussing  in  the  European  Union? 
MR.  HUMPHREYS:  Thank  you  for  that  question.  
Actually,  I  should  have  said  for  this  Salt  Bae  trademark  that,  although  he  is  a 
famous  Turkish  chef  and  he  has  restaurants  in  Istanbul,  London,  and  New  York  as  well  — 
I  don’t  know  where  in  New  York,  but  perhaps  somebody  will  tell  me  —  he  was  not  able 
to  show  acquired  distinctiveness  throughout  the  European  Union.  We  are  going  to  hear 
more  about  the  problems  of  that,  so  I  won’t  go  into  that  issue  in  any  detail.  Obviously, 
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just  showing  London  wasn’t  enough,  but  there  is  a  theoretical  possibility  of  establishing 
acquired  distinctiveness  for  these  kinds  of  marks. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Any  other  questions? 
[No  response] 
In  the  next  talk  Maria  will  talk  about  the  distinctive  character  acquired  through 
use  and  the  latest  case  law  on  that. 
MS.  MARTINS  RIBEIRO:  Thank  you. 
With  regard  to  a  mark  that  is  ab  initio devoid  of  distinctive  character  across  all 
Member  States,  how  did  the  Court  of  Justice  reconcile  the  need  to  prove  the  acquired 
distinctive  character  through  use  throughout  the  territory  of  the  European  Union  with  the 
“unreasonable”  requirement  of  proof  for  each  Member  State?  What  is  the  extent  and  what 
are  the  limits  of  the  evidence  required  to  establish  such  a  distinctive  character  in  the 
European  Union  of  twenty-eight  Member  States? 
The  appeals  submitted  to  the  Court  of  Justice  by  Nestlé  (supported  by  the  
8
European  Association  of  Trade  Mark  Owners  (Marques),  intervener  in  the  appeal),  by 
Mondelez  (rejected  as  inadmissible)  and  by  the  EUIPO  against  the  decision  of  the 
General  Court  in  the Mondelez  case  (also  known  as  the Kit  Kat  case),  finally  gave  the   
9
Court  the  opportunity  to  provide  some  clarification  concerning  its  own  case  law;  namely, 
the Storck  case  (paragraph  83)  and  the Chocoladefabriken Lindt &  Sprungli  case  
10
(paragraph  62).   
11
It  is  on  the  basis  of  the  nuanced  approach,  resulting  from  this  case  law  that,  first, 
the Louis  Vuitton  cases  and,  second,  the Mondelez  case,  brought  again,  to  the  
12
appreciation  of  the  Tribunal  and  then,  on  appeal,  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  Court  of  Justice, 
the  need  to  clarify  and  get  some  guidance  on  the  territorial  extent  of  the  proof  of  the 
distinctive  character  of  a  mark  through  use.  
The  EUIPO  changed  its  initial  position.  The  EUIPO  had,  in  a  first  step,  deemed 
necessary  to  defend  the  general  scheme  of  Article  7  of  Regulation  No  40/94,  implying  
13
8  Joined  Cases  C-84/17  P,  C-85/17  P  and  C-95/17  P,  Société  des  produits  Nestlé  SA  &  
Others  v.  Mondelez  UK  Holdings  &  Services  Ltd,  (July  25,  2018),  http://curia.europa.eu. 
9  Case  T-112/13,  Mondelez  UK  Holdings  &  Services  Ltd,  formerly  Cadbury  Holdings  
Ltd  v.  European  Union  Intellectual  Property  Office  (Dec.  15,  2016),  http://curia.europa.eu. 
10  Case  C-25/05  P,  Storck  v.  OHIM  (June  22,  2006), http://curia.europa.eu.  The  Court  of  
Justice  held  that  a  sign  can  only  be  registered  as  an  EU  trade  mark  under  article  7  (3)  of 
Regulation  No  207/2009  only  if  evidence  is  provided  that  it  has  acquired,  in  consequence  of  the 
use  which  has  been  made  of  it,  distinctive  character  in  the  part  of  the  European  Union  in  which  it 
did  not,  ab  initio,  have  such  character  for  the  purposes  of  article  7  (1)  (b).  In  the  same  paragraph, 
the  Court  of  Justice  added  that  the  part  of  the  European  Union  referred  to  in  Article  7  (2)  may  be 
comprised  of  a  single  Member  State. 
11  Case  C-98/11,  Chocoladefabriken  Lindt  &  Sprüngli  v.  OHIM  (May  24,  2012),  
http://curia.europa.eu .  The  Court  of  Justice,  even  considering  that  the  previous  assessment  made  in 
the  Storck  case  (footnote  3)  was  true,  has  however  considered  that  it  would  be  “unreasonable”  to 
require  proof  of  such  acquisition  for  each  individual  Member  State. 
12  Case  T-359/12,  Louis  Vuitton  Malletier  v.  OHIM  (April  21,  2015)  and  Case  T-360/12  
Louis  Vuitton  Malletier  v.  OHIM  (April  21,  2015),  http://curia.europa.eu. 
13  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  40/94  of  20  December  1993  on  the  Community  trade  
mark,  1994  O.J.  (L011)  1. 
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that  the  distinctive  character  through  use  may  not  be  shown  only  in  certain  Member 
States.  Later  on,  the  EUIPO  began  to  qualify  its  position,  and  from  a  test  implying  all  
14
Member  States  the  EUIPO  proposed  a  test  of  “sufficiency,”  considering  that  proof  that 
the  mark  had  acquired  distinctive  character  through  use  in  three  Member  States  could  not 
be  sufficient  to  prove  the  acquisition  of  such  a  distinctive  character  throughout  the 
European  Union.   
15
When  the Vuitton  and Mondelez  cases  were  brought  to  the  General  Court,  the  
16
EUIPO’s  position  had  definitely  evolved  towards  a  more  detailed  proposition,  giving  to  
17
the  General  Court  a  more  elaborated  approach  on  the  applicability  of  Article  7  (3)  of 
Regulation  No  207/2009.  Relying  mainly  on  the Chocoladefabriken Lindt  case,  the  
18
issue  had  become  the  determination  of  the  criteria  concerning  the  delimitation  of  the 
“substantial  part”  of  the  Union  territory  on  which  the  mark  would  have  been  deemed  to 
have  acquired  a  distinctive  character  by  use.   
19
In  the Mondelez  case,  the  Board  of  Appeal  stated  that  it  cannot  be  required  to 
show  distinctive  character  acquired  through  use  of  the  mark  Member  State  by  Member 
State  and  considered: 
•  whether  a  substantial  proportion  of  consumers  in  the  European  Union  as  a 
whole  had  been  exposed  to  the  mark  and  had  come  to  perceive  it  as  an  indication  of  the 
commercial  origin  of  the  goods  it  designated,  without  it  being  necessary  to  prove 
acquired  distinctiveness  everywhere; 
•  that  the  lack  of  evidence  regarding  the  recognition  of  the  mark  in  a  part  of  the 
internal  market  that  was  not  substantial  could  not  render  irrelevant  the  distinctive 
character  acquired  through  use  of  that  market  in  the  vast  majority  of  that  market;  and 
•  that  it  would  be  unreasonable  and  disproportionate  to  ask  the  proprietor  of  a 
trade  mark  to  devote  significant  amounts  of  money  to  collecting  evidence  of  the 
distinctive  character  acquired  through  use  of  that  mark  in  every  corner  of  the  internal 
market  and  to  refuse  to  protect  that  mark,  despite  having  been  proved  that  the  mark  was 
recognized  in  the  vast  majority  of  the  territory  of  the  European  Union. 
The  General  Court  annulled  the  decision  of  the  Board  of  Appeal. 
The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  the Mondelez  case,  dismissing  the  
20
14  Case  C-25/05  P,  Storck  a t  73  &  74. 
15  Case  C-98/11,  Chocoladefabriken  Lindt  at  56  &  57. 
16  The  applications  were  lodged  respectively,  on  8  August  2012  and  19  February  2013. 
17  The  EUIPO  had  abandoned  the  idea  that  “the  issue  was  not  one  of  use  of  the  sign  in  a  
“substantial  part”  of  the  Union  territory,  but  in  the  part  of  the  Union  where  the  mark  could  not,  by 
reason  of  its  characteristics,  fulfil  the  functions  typical  of  that  type  of  intellectual  property” 
(Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Ruiz-Jarabo  Colomer,  delivered  on  23  March  2006,  Storck  v 
OHMI,  C-25/05  P,  EU:C:2006:204,  paragraphs  75  and  76). 
18  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  207/2009  of  26  February  2009  on  the  Community  trade  
mark,  O.J.  (L  78)  1. 
19  According  to  the  EUIPO,  the  acquisition  of  distinctive  character  should  be  
substantiated  for  the  European  Union  as  a  whole  and  not  for  the  sum  of  its  national  markets,  this 
interpretation  being  inherent  to  the  very  existence  of  the  internal  market,  which  has  characteristics 
similar  to  those  obtaining  in  a  national  market.  
20  Case  T-112/13, Mondele z.  The  Court  of  Justice  was  asked,  in  their  appeal,  to  answer  
the  arguments  exposed  by  Nestlé,  Marques  and  the  EUIPO  in  support  of  the  ground  according  to 
 
Verbatim  Transceedings,  Inc. 714/960-4577 
12 
Session  10B 
 
 
appeals,  dealt  with  four  main  points: 
Firstly,  the  Court  recalled  the  unitary  character  of  the  EU  trade  mark  and  its  equal 
effect  throughout  the  European  Union,  and  referred  to  Article  7  of  the  Regulation  No 
207/2009,  implying  that  to  be  accepted  for  registration  a  sign  must  have  distinctive 
character,  inherent  or  acquired  through  use,  throughout  the  European  Union  (paragraphs 
66–68). 
Secondly,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  deemed  to  be  necessary  to  point  out  that  the 
Leno Merken  case,  invoked  by  the  appellants,  and  the Colloseum Holding  case  were   
21 22
not  relevant,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Court  held  that  the  requirements  that  apply  to 
verification  of  the  genuine  use  of  a  mark  (within  the  meaning  of  Article  15  (1)  of  the 
Regulation  No  40/94,  a  provision  that  was  reproduced  without  amendment  in  the  first 
paragraph  of  Article  15  (1)  of  Regulation  No  207/2009)  are  analogous  to  those 
concerning  the  acquisition  by a  sign  of  distinctive  character  through  use  for  the  purpose 
of  its  registration    (paragraphs  70–72). 
23
Moreover,  the  Court  of  Justice  highlighted  the  importance  of  Article  7  (2)  of 
Regulation  No  207/2009,  recalling  that  regarding  genuine  use  there  is  no  analogous 
provision  with  the  result  that  where  a  mark  has  not  been  used  in  part  of  the  European 
Union,  it  cannot  be  automatically  assumed  that  there  is  no  genuine  use  (paragraph  73  and 
a  reference  to  the  Leno  Merken  case  in  paragraph  74).  
Distinguishing  its  case  law  concerning  “genuine  use”  and  “distinctive  character 
acquired  through  use,”  the  Court  of  Justice  reaffirmed  the  principle  according  to  which  a 
mark  that  is, ab initio ,  devoid  of  distinctive  character  across  all  Member  States  can  be 
registered  only  if  it  is  proved  that  it  has  acquired  distinctive  character  through  use 
throughout  the  territory  of  the  European  Union  (paragraphs  75  and  76). 
Thirdly,  in  paragraphs  78  and  87,  the  Court  of  Justice  reiterated  the  same 
principle,  clearly  dismissing  the  reading  of  paragraph  62  of  the Chocoladefabriken Lindt 
case  proposed  by  the  appellants:  contrary  to  their  position,  it  does  not  follow  from  that 
paragraph  that  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  a  mark  has  acquired  distinctive  character 
through  use  in  a  significant  or  substantial  part  or  the  majority  of  the  territory  of  the 
European  Union,  but  it  must  be  shown  throughout  that  territory  (“throughout  the  Member 
which  the  General’s  Court  interpretation  of  Article  7  (3)  of  Regulation  No  207/2009  in  paragraph 
139  of  the  judgment  under  appeal  was  contradictory,  the  General  Court  having  erred  in  law  in  its 
interpretation  of  that  provision:  by  focusing  on  individual  national  markets,  the  General  Court’s 
decision  was  incompatible  with  the  unitary  character  of  the  EU  trade  mark  that  implies  that 
territorial  borders  within  the  EU  are  to  be  disregarded  for  the  purposes  of  assessing  the  acquisition 
of  distinctive  character  through  use. 
21  Case  C-149/11,  Leno  Merken  BV  v  Hagelkruis  Beheer  BV  (Dec.  19,  2012),  
http://curia.europa.eu. 
22  Case  C-12/12,  Colloseum  Holding  AG  v  Levi  Strauss  &  Co.  (April  18,  2013),  
http://curia.europa.eu. 
23  This  case  law,  which  does  not  relate  to  the  geographic  scope  that  is  relevant  for  the  
purposes  of  assessing  the  existence  of  genuine  use,  could  not  be  understood  as  meaning  that  the 
requirements  for  assessing  the  territorial  scope  that  permits  the  registration  of  a  mark  in 
consequence  of  its  use  (  the  Court  refers  probably  to  the  assertion  that  it  is  necessary  to  disregard 
the  territorial  borders  of  the  Members  States,  paragraph  71)  are  analogous  to  the  requirements 
permitting  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  the  proprietor  of  a  registered  mark. 
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States  of  the  European  Union,”  paragraph  83)  and  it  is  not,  therefore,  sufficient  to 
produce  evidence  that  does  not  cover  part  of  the  European  Union,  even  a  part  consisting 
of  only  one  Member  State.  
Fourthly,  the  Court  of  Justice  based  its  reasoning  in  the  distinction  drawn 
between  the  facts  to  be  proved  and  the  means  of  proving  such  facts  (paragraphs  79–83)  
24
to  establish  that  no  provision  of  Regulation  No  207/2009  requires  separate  evidence  to  be 
produced  in  each  individual  Member  State  and  that,  consequently,  it  is  not  inconceivable 
that  the  evidence  provided  in  order  to  establish  that  a  sign  has  acquired  distinctive 
character  through  use  is  relevant  with  regard  to  several  Member  States,  or  even  to  the 
whole  of  the  European  Union. 
Finally,  it  remains  to  be  seen  which  evidence  will  be  submitted  and  what  are  the 
criteria  to  be  applied  for  assessing  the  evidence  submitted  for  some  Member  States  in 
order  to  establish  the  acquisition  of  a  distinctive  character  through  use  in  other  Member 
States.  In  this  regard,  I  would  submit  three  observations. 
The  first  observation  is  that  the  Court  of  Justice  undoubtedly  took  into 
consideration  the  concern  underlying  the Chocoladefabriken Lindt  case,  allowing  for  the 
possibility  of  enlarging the  means  of  providing  evidence  without  nevertheless  opening  a 
breach  into  the  unitary  character  of  the  EU  trademark  and  in  the  philosophy  of  the  system 
that  does  not  seem  to  pursue  a  lower  standard  of  the  requirement  of  the  distinctive 
character  of  a  sign  where  it  is  acquired  through  use  in  comparison  with  a  sign  with 
inherent  distinctive  character.  Thus,  evidence  may  be  produced  with  regard  to  territories 
of  the  Member  States,  taken  globally  or  in  a  separate  way  for  different  Member  States  or 
some  groups  of  Member  States,  provided  that  that  evidence  is  aimed  at  establishing  the 
distinctiveness  of  a  sign  acquired  through  use  throughout  the  entire  territory  of  the 
European  Union,  without  leaving  aside  any  part  of  that  territory. 
Second,  I  would  submit  that  the  approach  adopted  by  the  Court  of  Justice  does 
not  appear  to  be  so  much,  neither  necessarily,  a  quantitative  approach  as  the 
Chocoladefabriken Lindt  case  could  have  led  some  to  think,  but  rather  a  qualitative  
25
approach  aiming  at  determining  that  the  evidence  produced  in  order  to  prove  the 
distinctive  character  of  a  mark  acquired  through  use  in  a  Member  State  provides  the  same 
result  regarding  another  Member  State,  that  is  to  say,  is  capable  of  establishing  such 
acquisition  in  another  Member  State. 
Moreover,  the  Court  of  Justice  gave  some  guidance  on  how  evidence  could  be 
relevant  with  regard  to  several  Member  States,  taking  into  consideration  either  the 
behavior  of  the  economic  operators  or  the  existence  of  certain  similarities  between 
Member  States.  The  Court  referred  to  two  situations:  (1)  when  by  means  of  the  same 
distribution  network,  economic  operators  treat  several  Member  States  as  if  they  were  one 
24  Namely,  the  acquisition  of  distinctive  character  through  use  by  a  sign  that  is  devoid  of  
inherent  distinctive  character. 
25  According  to  Advocate  General  Wathelet,  the  Court  had  concluded  that  providing  
evidence  for  three  Member  States  only  was  not  quantitatively  sufficient  to  be  extrapolated  to  the 
whole  of  the  EU  (Opinion  delivered  on  19  April  2018,  Société  des  Produits  Nestlé  SA,  Mondelez 
UK  Holdings  &  Services  Ltd  and  European  Union  Intellectual  Property  Office  (EUIPO),  joined 
cases  C-84/17  P,  C-85/17  P  and  C-95/17  P,  EU:  C:  2018:266). 
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and  the  same  national  market;  (2)  when  there  is  a  geographic,  cultural,  or  linguistic 
proximity  between  two  Member  States  and  the  relevant  public  of  the  first  has  a  sufficient 
knowledge  of  the  products  and  services  that  are  present  on  the  national  market  of  the 
second. 
The  third  observation  tends  to  highlight  the  fact  that,  nevertheless,  the  solution 
decided  by  the  Court  of  Justice,  which  is  to  reconcile  the  alleged  high  costs  and  the  very 
high  burden  of  gathering  all  the  necessary  evidence  for  each  Member  State  with  the 
imperative  requirement  of  establishing  the  distinctive  character  through  use  of  a  mark 
throughout  the  European  Union,  is  not  without  its  difficulties.  Indeed,  it  implies  not  only 
a  solid  demonstration  by  the  owner  of  the  mark  of  the  applicability  of  the  evidence  with 
regard  to  several  Member  States,  or  groups  of  Member  States,  or  even  to  the  whole  of  the 
European  Union,  but  also  a  rigorous  assessment  clearly  stated  of  the  relevant  evidence  by 
the  bodies  of  the  EUIPO  to  which,  as  the  Court  of  Justice  expressly  reminded,  the 
primary  responsibility  belongs.     26 27
I  will  finish  and  stay  here  for  eventually  some  questions.  Thank  you. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you  for  that  presentation. 
It  sounds  like  a  very  tough  requirement  having  to  prove  acquired  distinctiveness 
in  all  twenty-eight  (soon  twenty-seven)  Member  States.  Do  you  think  that  the  Court 
raised  the  burden  here  too  high,  or  what  does  it  mean  in  practice  when  you  apply  this 
decision? 
MR.  SMITH:  I  agree  with  Maria  that  it  is  a  stringent  set  of  requirements  now. 
Even  if  you  are  looking  at  putting  in  evidence  which  might  cover  several  Member  States, 
or  in  theory  could  cover  the  whole  European  Union,  it  definitely  feels  like  the  burden  has 
increased. 
The  other  concern  I  have  is  based  on  a  practical  point  of  view  —  I  mean,  given 
the  length  of  this  particular  case,  which  I  think  is  getting  on  to  ten  years  —  the  parties  put 
in  evidence  early  on  when  they  didn’t  really  necessarily  think  through  the  importance  of 
having  substantial,  maybe  more  extensive,  evidence  than  they  did.  
26  This  is  not  without  reminding  us,  in  a  different  context,  of  the Ornua  case  (judgment  of  
20  July  2017  in  Ornua  Co-operative  Ltd.  v.  Tindale  &  Stanton  Ltd.  España  SL,  C-93/16, 
EU:C:2017:571),  where  in  response  to  the  question  of  a  possible  extrapolation  of  a  peaceful 
coexistence  between  an  EU  trade  mark  and  a  national  mark  in  two  Member  States  to  another 
Member  State,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  answered  negatively.  More  importantly,  when  giving  the 
possibility  to  the  court  hearing  the  case  of  considering  the  relevant  factors  of  the  two  Member 
States  to  determine  the  right  of  the  proprietor  of  the  trade  mark  to  prohibit  the  use  of  a  sign  in  the 
other  Member  State,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  clearly  imposed  the  need  for  that  court  to  ensure,  in 
its  global  assessment  of  all  relevant  factors,  that  the  market  conditions  and  the  sociocultural  or 
other  circumstances  do  not  vary  significantly  from  one  part  of  the  European  Union  to  another.  
27  It  follows  from  the  jurisprudence  that  the  General  Court  has  already  considered,  
namely,  that  a  reference  to  general  and  abstract  data  is  not  sufficient,  that  secondary  evidence 
(sales  volumes  and  advertising  material)  may  only  support,  where  relevant,  direct  proof  (surveys, 
market  research,  statements)  and  that  the  results  of  surveys  conducted  in  certain  Member  States  (6 
of  15  and  10  of  27)  cannot  be  extrapolated  to  the  Member  States  in  which  no  surveys  took  place, 
in  particular  and  amongst  others  because  the  applicant  had  not  demonstrated  that  certain  Member 
States  markets  covered  by  the  surveys  were  comparable  to  the  others. 
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I  think  it  factors  in  other  practical  points,  like  do  you  want  a  document  retention 
policy?  Are  people  actually  keeping  this  kind  of  evidence  for  when  they  need  to  prove 
distinctiveness  on  this  scale? 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  James,  what  do  you  make  of  this  case? 
MR.  NURTON:  When  we  read  the  General  Court’s  decision  in  this  case, 
everyone  thought  it  was  a  very  challenging,  almost  impossible,  burden  for  a  lot  of 
companies,  given  that  you  had  to  show  acquired  distinctiveness  in  every  Member  State, 
some  of  which  are  very  small  and  have  very  small  markets.  In  that  sense,  the  Court  of 
Justice’s  decision  is  a  little  bit  more  favorable  and  gives  a  glimmer  of  light. 
But  I  think  in  practice  it  is  still  going  to  be  very  difficult,  isn’t  it,  to  meet  the 
requirement  for  the  reasons  that  have  been  explained? 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Yes.  And  surveys  here  will  play  an  important  role.  
Gordon,  can  you  maybe  elaborate  on  that? 
MR.  HUMPHREYS:  I  should  say  that  the  decision  of  the  Boards  of  Appeal  that 
was  overturned  here  was  taking  a  rather  brave  stance  and  departed  from  the  one  that  had 
traditionally  been  taken  by  the  Boards  and  the  EUIPO  in  general.  So  in  some  ways  this  is 
an  indication  that  it  is  “business  as  usual”  rather  than  any  great  reversal  of  policy. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  James  said,  it  does  hold  out  a  sort  of  olive  branch  with  the 
market  conditions  being  comparable.  Certainly,  anybody  who  has  been  to  Spain  or 
Portugal  will  know  that  many  of  the  products  are  produced  for  the  Iberian  market,  not 
just  for  one  of  those  Member  States.  I  think  this  would  be  a  fertile  ground  for  actually 
showing  that  there  was  use. 
More  particularly,  I  think  it  has  a  practical  application  for  when  people  bring 
global  turnover  figures,  say  for  the  Iberian  peninsula,  which  does  happen  because  a  lot  of 
businesses  in  Spain  and  Portugal  are  doing  business  in  both  countries  but  they  don’t  keep 
independent  records,  so  they  have  global  figures.  This  will  enable  them  to  actually  show 
that  the  mark  is  being  used  in  both  Member  States. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you. 
Let’s  move  on  to  our  final  talk  by  Judge  Brinkman.  He  will  give  us  an  update  on 
descriptive  trademarks. 
JUDGE  BRINKMAN:  Thank  you.  I  will  hurry  up.  Everybody  is  getting  tired,  of 
course,  as  we  are  drawing  to  a  close,  but  I  will  try  to  keep  you  awake  with  this  thrilling 
and  enthralling  talk. 
First  of  all,  as  always,  this  is  my  personal  opinion,  just  scientific,  and  doesn’t 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  court  that  I  also  am  a  member  of. 
I  am  going  to  talk  to  you  and  quickly  get  you  through  a  couple  of  the  points  that  I 
want  to  talk  about,  descriptive  trademarks.  You  will  find  that  topic  in  the  additional 
handout.  Somehow  it  wasn’t  in  the  original  program  bundle  what  I  was  going  to  talk 
about. 
These  are  the  points  that  I  am  going  to  talk  about:  first,  a  quick  recap  of  the 
applicable  law  and  the  case  law;  then  absolute  grounds  of  refusal,  where  I  will  indicate  a 
problem  that  I  have  come  across;  limitations  to  infringement  is  another  problem  that  I 
have  come  across;  and  a  couple  of  caveats  I  will  to  talk  to  you  about.  
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First  of  all,  the  applicable  law.  I  suppose  most  of  you  will  know  this.  Absolute 
grounds  for  refusal:  if  it  is  descriptive  of  a  characteristic  it  shouldn’t  be  a  mark.  We  are 
talking  most  of  the  time  about  word  marks  here.  You  don’t  get  a  trademark  then. 
On  the  infringement  side,  if  you  use  a  sign  in  a  descriptive  sense,  basically  you 
don’t  infringe.  But  I  should  add  that  subparagraph  (2)  of  Article  14  also  requires  that  28
such  descriptive  use  is  “fair.”  I  translated  it  as  being  fair,  but  it  says,  “according  to  honest 
practices  in  industrial  and  commercial  matters.”  So  there  is  an  extra  condition  that  I  will 
talk  about  a  little  later.  That  is  something  I  have  come  across  as  being  a  problem. 
The  case  law:  It  has  been  fifteen  years  since  CJEU  decisions  in Post  Office  and  29
Biomild ,   so  that  sort  of  made  a  trigger  to  look  back  and  see  how  things  stand  now.  30
The Post  Office  and  the Biomild  cases  were  both  references  from  Dutch  courts. 
The  CJEU  said  basically  if  there  is  a  public  interest  to  keep  something  free,  then  that  term 
means  it  should  be  free, freely  used  by  all,  when  it  may  serve  to  designate  or  to  describe, 
and  terms  of  that  sort.  That  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  already  in  use  as  a 
descriptive  term.  That  can  occur  later,  and  also  it  is  enough  if  it  could  be  used  for 
description  in  one  of  its  possible  meanings. 
Also,  the  existence  of  synonyms,  even  if  they  are  more  in  use  than  others,  is 
irrelevant.  The  threshold  for  descriptiveness  is,  therefore,  low  if  you  look  at  it.  
Before  going  on,  I  will  also  briefly  go  into  the Biomild  case.  There  it  was 
basically  held  that  if  you  combine  two  descriptive  terms,  it’s  not  good  enough;  you  have 
to  prove  that  it’s  sufficiently  far  removed  if  you  combine.  So  even  if  it’s  a  neologism, 
then  that  is  not  enough. 
Going  on  to  EUIPO  Guidelines,  I  find  that  they  seem  to  give  more  room  to 
register  descriptive  marks.  Why  do  I  say  that?  Because  there  they  say  it  is  enough  if  it  is 
only  immediately  perceived  by  the  relevant  public  as  descriptive.  Before,  you’ll 
remember  that Post  Office said  “may  describe”  or  “could  be  used.”  The  Guidelines  also 
use  words  like  “sufficiently  direct  and  specific”  and  “without  further  reflection.”  These 
are  references  to  CFI  decisions  that  are  very  old  already,  actually  a  few  before Post  Office 
and  just  a  few  very  shortly  after Post  Office .  So  the  Guidelines  and  CFI  say  that  if  the 
public  would  with  no  further  reflection  see  that  it  is  descriptive,  a  mark  should  be 
refused.  The  CJEU  seems  to  be  stricter  in Post  Office and Biomild and,  therefore, 
consider  a  term  easier  as  descriptive.  
I’ve  put  in  this  table  here  the  differences: 
•  “may  serve”  as  opposed  to  “immediately  perceived.” 
•  “could  be  used”  as  opposed  to  “sufficiently  direct  and  specific.” 
 •  Synonyms  are  irrelevant;  “without  further  reflection”  means  that  under  CFI  and  
Guidelines  criteria,  there  seems  to  be  more  room  for  adding  a  descriptive  trademark  to 
the  Register  (e.g.,  regarding  possible  future  descriptive  uses).  It  seems  to  me  that  under 
28  Directive  (EU)  2015/2436  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 
December  2015  to  approximate  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  trade  marks,  2015  O.J. 
(L336)  1.  
29  Case  C  363/99,  Koninklijke  KPN  Nederland  v.  Benelux-Merkenbureau  (Feb.  12, 
2004),  http://curia.europa.eu. 
30  Case  C  265/00,  Campina  Melkunie  BV  v.  Benelux-Merkenbureau  (Feb.  12,  2004), 
http://curia.europa.eu . 
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Post  Office  that  will  not  be  possible,  but  under  these  conditions  from  the  EUIPO  and  the 
CFI  it  seems  to  be  that  you  could. 
I  have  put  in  as  an  example  the  case  of SPARTAN  for  “organizing  obstacle  runs” 
where  you  could  say  it’s  descriptive,  because  many  people  sort  of  know  what  “spartan” 
means;  it  means  that  it’s  very  tough  —  obstacle  run,  right? 
But  if  you  look  at  it,  does  everybody  “ immediately  perceive  that”  or  is  it 
“sufficiently  direct  and  specific?”  It  is  debatable.  Whereas  if  you  look  at  the Post  Office 
criteria  from  the  CJEU,  it  seems  much  clearer  you  cannot  get  such  a  wordmark  through. 
If  you  put  a  descriptive  term  in  a  logo,  what  do  we  get  then?  Obviously,  because 
of  the  graphics,  you  will  be  able  to  get  a  trademark  registration.  But  can  the  trademark 
owner  then  oppose  descriptive  use  by  his  competitor,  or  even  when  such  term  is  used  in  a 
different  logo  by  a  competitor,  when  he  himself  uses  it  as  a  trademark? 
How  do  you  go  about  these  types  of  cases?  There  are  basically  three  points  that 
you  can  make  there: 
•  Solution  (1)  is  “I  don’t  find  them  confusing  because  the  only  thing  that  is  similar  is  the 
descriptive  part.”  That  is  one  solution. 
•  Or  (2)  you  look  at  the  exceptions  (see  Slide  4)  to  trademark  use  and  you  say,  “This  use 
is  in  a  descriptive  manner  and  therefore  you  should  fall  free.” 
But  then  you  have  the  problem  that  there  is  the  loyalty  duty  to  the  trademark 
owner;  and  is  it  loyal  as  a  competitor  to  not  only  use  a  term  to  describe  a  characteristic  of 
your  goods  but  also  put  it  in  a  logo  and  use  it  as  a  trademark?  I  would  say  that  there  is 
probably  a  problem  there. 
For  instance,  I  had  a  case, LiveSafe  v.  McAfee ,  where  the  only  thing  that  was 
actually  the  same  was  the  word  “livesafe,”  and  there  was  rather  small  graphics  to  it.  But 
does  that  mean  that  you  can  oppose  the  use  of LIVESAFE  by  McAfee  as  part  of  logo?  In  that 
case,  it  was  held  that  could  not  be  the  case  because  then  through  the  backdoor  you  still 
get  protection  for  a  word  mark  that  would  not  be  allowed  under  the  Post  Office  criteria. 
I  see  my  time  is  already  up.  
This  is  the  essence  of  what  I  wanted  to  talk  about.  You  can  look  at  the  sheets 
again.  They  will  be  online  because  this  was  very  short.  
 These  are  problems  that  we  encounter.  There  is  a  tremendous  amount  of  cases  that  
come  in  that  have  these  types  of  problems  because  most  companies  want  something 
descriptive  in  their  marks.  So  it  is  something  that  we  come  across  a  lot. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you,  Judge  Brinkman. 
Obviously,  Gordon,  I  want  to  give  you  a  chance  to  react  to  the  different  standards 
that  he  has  described  between  the  EUIPO  and  the  case  law. 
MR.  HUMPHREYS:  The  case  law  from  the  Court  of  Justice  as  opposed  to  the 
General  Court,  which  seems  to  be  following  the  EUIPO. 
I  think  what  Edger  said  is  very  interesting  and  I  fully  take  it  onboard.  Actually,  it 
is  the  first  time  that  I  have  ever  heard  that  the  EUIPO  is  being  too  liberal.  Normally, 
everybody  complains  that  we  are  very  strict.  In  fact,  it  is  a  common  submission  before 
the  Boards  of  Appeal  to  say,  “Well,  I’ve  registered  this  at  the  USPTO,  I’ve  registered  it  in 
Australia,  I’ve  registered  it  at  the  UKIPO.  All  these  English-speaking  offices  have 
registered  it,  but  you  are  the  only  office  that  doesn’t  want  to  register  it.”  So  actually  the 
perception  that  I’ve  understood  is  that  we  are  rather  strict. 
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But  I  think  the  danger  of  being  too  liberal  is  that  these  trademarks  come  back  to 
bite  us  in  opposition.  I  am  very  happy  to  see  that,  at  least  in  the  Netherlands,  there  is  a 
serious  examination  of  the  English  language.  In  many  Member  States  in  Europe,  the 
position  simply  is,  “English  is  not  an  official  language  of  this  country;  we  do  not  consider 
the  meaning  in  English,”  and  then  you  get  a  very  bad  mark  that  goes  on  the  register  that 
is  then  used  to  oppose  an  application  at  the  EUIPO.  I  agree  that  we  should  be  strict. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  We  have  time  for  one  question  from  the  audience. 
QUESTION  [Anne  Marie  Verschuur,  Nautadutilh,  The  Netherlands]:  Judge 
Brinkman,  I  would  be  interested  if  you  could  elaborate  a  bit  more  on  the  fair  use,  the 
“honest  use  in  commercial  practices”  requirement,  because  I  find  it  difficult  to  explain 
why  often  that  is  not  the  case.  Is  it  also  an  element  that  you  find?  You  did  briefly  mention 
it,  but  is  that  an  element  you  also  find  difficult  or  challenging,  or  do  you  think  that  is  less 
of  an  issue  than  the  other  things  you  talked  about? 
JUDGE  BRINKMAN:  For  sure  I  find  it  challenging  because  what  you  often  see 
is  that  the  competitor  uses  the  descriptive  word  in  his  or  her  trademark  too.  So  you  could 
say  that  if  you  use  it  as  a  trademark,  as  a  competitor,  is  that  then  still  considered  to  be  fair 
use  or  loyal  to  the  trademark  owner  of  a  logo  where  there  is  such  a  descriptive  term?  If 
you  find  it  to  be  infringing,  it  seems  to  me  that  is  difficult  to  argue,  or  at  least  it  is  more 
difficult  to  say  that  using  a  descriptive  term  as  part  of  a  logo  is  fair  use.  That  would  mean, 
however,  that  sort  of  through  the  backdoor  the  descriptive  term  cannot  be  freely  used. 
That  is,  I  think,  not  what  Post  Office  meant. 
I  didn’t  get  to  the Solid  Floor  case, which  I  find  very  puzzling.  There  you  see  31
what  happens.  This  is  a  logo  for  hard  floors,  registered;  versus  a  competitor  who  was 
using  a  logo  with  also  “Solid  Floor”  in  its  logo.  This  trademark  was  refused  on  the 
grounds  that  it  was  infringing  or  confusingly  similar  to  the  first  Solid  Floor . 
 But  the  only  thing  there  that’s  the  same  is  the  descriptive  words  “Solid  Floor.”  So  I  find  
this  one  very  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  criteria  of  Post  Office  as  an  example.  
And  also,  because  in  this  case  it  was  held  that  even  if  the  term  is  descriptive,  it 
can  still  be  a  dominant  component  of  the  trademark  and,  therefore,  play  a  big  role  in  the 
confusing  similarity.  
So  it  is  a  difficult  one.  I  would  have  decided  this  one  differently  perhaps,  to  be 
honest. 
MR.  SCHONHOFEN:  Thank  you  very  much  to  the  panel. 
31  Case  C-190/15  P,  Fetim  BV  v.  Office  for  Harmonisation  in  the  Internal  Market  (Nov. 
19,  2005),  http://curia.europa.eu . 
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